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LIBRARY 

THE  UNIVERSITY 
OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


GIFT  OF 
MRS.  BRUCE  C.  HOPPER 


The  Operations  of  the  British 
Army  in  the  Present  War 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS 


c 


The  Operations  of  the  British 
Army  in  the  Present  War 

THE  RETREAT 
FROM   MONS 

WITH    A    PREFACE    BY 
FIELD  MARSHAL  LORD  FRENCH 


BOSTON    AND    NEW    YORK 

HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 

(C|)e  Ctitaetj^ibe  ^xt9^  Cambridge 

1917 


^ 


^ 


COPYRIGHT,    I917,    BY   HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN   COMPANY 
ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 

Published  July  iqij 


PREFACE 

I  AM  told  that  it  has  been  thought 
advisable  to  publish  short  accounts 
in  pamphlet  form  of  prominent 
and  important  operations  which 
have  been  carried  on  during  the 
course  of  the  war  which  is  still 
raging. 

Such  war  stories  may  undoubt- 
edly be  beneficial,  and  in  the  be- 
lief that  such  *' propaganda"  is 
productive  of  more  good  than 
harm  I  have  consented  to  indite 
this  very  brief  preface  to  The  Re- 
treat from  Mons. 

Any  hesitation  I  may  have  felt 
arises  from  my  profound  convic- 
tion that  no  history  of  a  war  or  any 
part  of  a  war  can  be  worth  any- 


vi  PREFACE 

thing  until  some  period  after  peace 
has  been  made  and  the  full  facts 
are  known  and  understood. 

This  pamphlet  however,  is  not 
so  much  a  "history"  as  an  inter- 
esting summary  or  a  chronology 
of  leading  events,  and  the  writer 
carefully  avoids  according  praise 
or  blame  in  connection  with  any 
event  or  group  of  events  which  can 
ever  become  the  subject  of  con- 
troversy. 

In  a  Preface  to  so  brief  and  so 
unpretentious  a  military  work  as 
this,  it  is  impossible  to  put  before 
the  reader  more  than  a  glimpse  of 
the  situation  in  regard  to  which 
plans  had  to  be  conceived  and  put 
into  execution  as  suddenly  and 
speedily  as  the  demand  for  them 
was  unexpected. 


PREFACE  vii 

That  it  is  the  "unexpected" 
which  generally  happens  in  war, 
and  that  it  is  the  "unexpected"  for 
which  we  must  be  ever  ready,  has 
of  late  years  been  deeply  instilled 
in  the  mind  of  the  British  officer. 
A  cardinal  axiom  in  his  military 
creed  is  that  he  must  never  be 
taken  by  surprise. 

When,  therefore,  the  Germans, 
on  the  same  principle  as  they  sub- 
sequently used  poison-gas,  sank 
hospital  ships,  and  disregarded 
every  known  rule  of  civilized  war, 
suddenly  and  quite  unexpectedly 
overran  a  neutral  country  in  such 
a  drastic  manner  as  to  nullify  all 
preconceived  plans  and  possibili- 
ties, and  the  British  Army  found 
itself  on  the  outer  flank  of  the 
threatened  line  exposed  to  the  full 


viii  PREFACE 

weight  of  the  German  menace,  it 
was  this  previous  careful  training 
which  formed  the  sure  foundation 
upon  which  to  plan  and  conduct 
the  inevitable  retreat  and  carry  it 
to  a  successful  conclusion. 

When  men  are  told  to  retire 
without  fighting,  when  they  see  no 
reason  for  it,  when  they  remain 
full  of  ardour  and  longing  to  get 
at  the  enemy,  and  are  not  allowed 
to,  demoralization  is  very  apt  to 
be  the  result.  Why  was  such  a 
feature  of  the  Retreat  conspicuous 
by  its  complete  non-existence?  Be- 
cause of  another  result  of  British 
military  training,  namely,  the  ab- 
solute confidence  of  the  men  in 
their  leaders  and  officers  and  the 
wonderful  mutual  understanding 
which  existed  between  them. 


PREFACE  ix 

The  magnificent  spirit  which 
animated  the  British  Expedition- 
ary Force  was  seen  at  every  phase 
of  these  operations;  in  the  skilful 
handling  and  moral  superiority  of 
the  cavalry  which  covered  the  Re- 
treat; in  the  able  conduct  by  the 
respective  leaders  of  the  several 
battles  and  encounters  which  local 
circumstances  rendered  necessary; 
and  lastly,  in  the  extraordinary 
marching  powers  and  capability 
of  endurance  which  animated  all 
ranks. 

Controversies  loud  and  bitter 
will  certainly  rage  in  regard  to  all 
the  dispositions  and  plans  under 
which  this  war  has  been  conducted; 
as  to  the  operations  of  the  first 
three  weeks,  perhaps,  more  than 
as  to  those  of  any  other  period. 


X  PREFACE 

But  I  venture  to  hope  and  believe 
that  no  sane  person  can  dispute  in 
the  smallest  particular  the  claims 
which  I  make  in  this  very  short 
Preface  on  behalf  of  the  forces 
which  it  is  the  great  pride  and  glory 
of  my  life  to  have  commanded. 

French 
F.M. 

Whitehall 
April  23,  1917. 


The  Operations  of  the  British 
Army  in  the  Present  War 


INTRODUCTORY 


The  Operations  of  the  British 
Army  in  the  Present  War 


INTRODUCTORY 

The  first  quality  of  British  mil- 
itary operations  in  the  present  war 
—  and  so  it  will  strike  the  future 
historian  —  is  their  astonishing 
variety  and  range.  Beginnmg  on 
the  ancient  battlefields  of  France 
and  Flanders,  they  have  spread, 
in  a  series  of  expanding  and  appar- 
ently inevitable  waves,  over  a 
good  part  of  three  continents,  so 
that,  wherever  the  enemy  was  to  be 
found,  —  whether  in  Europe,  or 
Asia,  or  Africa,  or  in  the  islands 


4    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

of  the  high  seas,  —  there  also, 
sooner  or  later,  were  the  British 
arms.  There  was  a  time  when  one 
or  two  campaigns  were  thought 
amply  sufficient  for  the  military 
energies  of  the  most  warlike  nation. 
We  have  never  pretended  to  be 
warlike,  meeting  our  emergencies 
always,  with  a  certain  reluctance, 
as  they  arose;  but  in  the  present 
war  we  have  seldom  had  fewer  than 
SIX  considerable  campaigns  on  our 
hands  at  one  time,  and  these  in 
areas  separated  often  by  thousands 
of  miles  from  one  another  and  from 
us.  It  is  one  of  the  obligations  of  a 
great  empire  at  war  that  it  should 
be  so;  it  is  one  of  the  privileges  of 
a  great  maritime  empire  that  it 
should  be  possible.  It  is  undoubt- 
edly the  grand  characteristic  of  the 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS       5 

operations  of  the  British  Army  in 
this  war,  and  gives  the  only  true 
perspective  of  our  miUtary  effort 
in  the  field.  To  our  share  in  the 
Allied  front  must  always  be  added 
the  fighting  frontiers  of  the  Em- 
pire. 

The  British  Army,  now  grown 
out  of  all  recognition,  was  small, 
and  known  to  be  small,  when  the 
war  began.  It  was  a  voluntary 
army,  numbering  approximately 
700,000  men,  of  whom  about 
450,000  (including  reservists)  were 
trained  soldiers,  liable  for  service 
abroad,  and  the  remainder,  a  half- 
trained  Territorial  Force,  enrolled 
for  service  at  home.  Besides  being 
small,  it  was,  from  the  nature  of 
its  duties,  widely  scattered.  Over 
100,000  of  our  best  troops  were 


6    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

serving  at  the  time  in  India  or  on 
foreign  stations.  For  all  purposes, 
therefore,  when  war  broke  out,  we 
had  in  this  country  a  mobilizable 
army  of  something  under  600,000 
trained  and  half -trained  men,  250,- 
000  of  whom  were  liable  only  for 
service  at  home.  The  striking  or 
Expeditionary  Force  of  this  army 
was  a  fully  equipped  and  highly 
professional  body  of  six  infantry 
divisions  and  one  division  of  cav- 
alry, and  with  this  force  we  entered 
the  war.  Intended  primarily,  as  its 
name  implied,  for  protective  or 
punitive  operations  within  the  Em- 
pire, it  was  on  a  scale  proportionate 
to  its  purpose  and  to  the  size  of  our 
army.  Our  army,  judged  by  a 
European  standard,  being  small, 
our  Expeditionary  Force,  judged 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS      7 

by  that  standard,  was  diminutive; 
and  the  chief  problem  which  con- 
fronted the  Government,  when  it 
was  decided  to  send  this  force  to 
France,  was  how  to  support  and 
supplement  it.  The  story  of  how 
this  problem  was  faced  and  over- 
come, of  how  "Home  Service" 
men  became  "Foreign  Service'* 
in  a  day,  and  our  little  army  of 
700,000,  by  a  gigantic  effort  of 
British  determination  and  Imperial 
good-will,  was  expanded  into  an 
army  of  millions  —  all  this  is  a 
separate  narrative,  to  be  related 
elsewhere;  but  we  cannot  afford  to 
overlook  it  as  we  follow  the  for- 
tunes of  the  Expeditionary  Force 
in  France  and  Flanders.  It  is  the 
military  background  of  all  their 
triumphs  and  vicissitudes,  and  had 


8    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

an  effect  upon  the  tone  of  the  war 
almost  from  the  first.  Even  to  our 
Expeditionary  Force  itself,  with 
all  its  cheerful  self-confidence  and 
efficiency,  it  meant  something  to 
know  that  the  country  was  in  ear- 
nest; that  as  early  as  August  23, 
while  they  were  still  fighting  among 
the  coal-pits  of  Mons,  the  first 
100,000  volunteers  had  been  en- 
rolled, and  were  already  deep  in 
the  mysteries  of  forming  fours. 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS 

When  a  country  goes  to  war  the 
first  test  of  its  military  efficiency  is 
the  mobiUzation  of  its  army.  This 
is  a  stage  in  the  history  of  wars 
which  the  pubfic  is  apt  to  overlook, 
because  the  arrangements  are  nec- 
essarily secret  and  complex,  and 
are  carried  out  in  that  first  hush 
which  precedes  communiques  and 
great  conflicts  in  the  field.  It  is 
nevertheless  true  that  every  war 
starts  in  the  Department  of  the 
Quartermaster  General,  and  that  by 
the  nature  of  this  start  the  issue  of 
a  war  may  be  decided.  We  started 
well.  From  August  5,  when  mobili- 
zation began,  —  in  spite  of  bank 
holidays  and  Territorials  en  route 


12    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH    ARMY 

for  summer  camps,  —  the  whole 
scheme  of  concentration  and  des- 
patch was  carried  out  almost  ex- 
actly to  schedule,  and  without  a 
hitch.  It  is  calculated  that,  dur- 
ing the  busiest  period,  the  railway 
companies,  now  under  Govern- 
ment control  and  brilliantly  di- 
rected by  an  executive  committee 
of  general  managers,  were  able  to 
run  as  many  as  eighteen  hundred 
special  trains  in  five  days,  an  aver- 
age of  three  hundred  and  sixty 
trains  a  day,  and  all  up  to  time. 
The  concentration  of  the  Home 
Forces  and  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force  proceeded  concurrently.  On 
August  9  the  first  elements  of  the 
Force  embarked,  and  nine  days 
later  the  greater  part  of  it  had 
been    landed  in  France,  and   was 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     13 

moving  by  way  of  Amiens  to  its 
unknown  fortunes.  The  smooth- 
ness, rapidity,  above  all  the  se- 
crecy with  which  the  transporta- 
tion was  carried  out,  made  a  great 
impression  at  the  time,  and  will 
always  be  admired.  The  question 
of  how  it  was  done  excited,  char- 
acteristically enough,  less  interest. 
We  are  a  people  accustomed  to 
happy  improvisations,  and  it  was 
generally  assumed  that  this  national 
talent  had  once  more  come  to  our 
rescue;  the  truth  being  that  in 
these  matters  improvisation  can 
seldom  be  happy,  and  that  for 
instant  and  complete  success  the 
only  method  is  long  and  careful 
preparation  in  time  of  peace.  For 
several  years  the  military,  naval, 
and  civilian  authorities  concerned 


14    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

had  been  engaged  upon  such  a 
scheme  of  preparation,  and  had, 
indeed,  concluded  their  labours 
not  many  months  before  war  broke 
out.  When  the  day  came  all  rail- 
way and  naval  transport  oflBcers 
were  at  their  posts,  and  the  Rail- 
way Executive  Committee,  in  its 
offices  in  Parliament  Street,  was 
calmly  carrying  out  a  time-table 
with  every  detail  of  which  it  had 
long  been  familiar.  Such  perfect 
preparedness  is  rare  in  our  history, 
and  worthy  of  note.  Amidst  the 
vast  unreadiness  of  the  nation  for 
war  the  despatch  of  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  and  the  magnificent 
readiness  of  the  fleet  which  made  it 
possible,  stand  out  in  grand  relief, 
not  to  be  lost  sight  of  or  forgotten. 
The   Expeditionary   Force   was 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     15 

commanded  by  Field  Marshal  Sir 
John  French,  and  consisted,  up  to 
August  23,  of  four  complete  divi- 
sions of  infantry  (the  First,  Second, 
Third,  and  Fifth)  and  five  brigades 
of  cavalry;  that  is  to  say,  about 
80,000  men.  On  August  24  it  was 
joined  by  the  Nineteenth  Infantry 
Brigade,  which  added  4000  more; 
and  on  August  25  by  the  Fourth 
Division,  which  added  another 
17,000.  Our  total  strength,  there- 
fore, during  the  fighting  at  Mons 
and  in  the  Retreat,  varied  from 
80,000  to  a  little  over  100,000  men. 
It  was  a  small  force,  but  of  a 
quality  rarely  seen.  No  finer  fight- 
ing unit  ever  entered  the  field.  In 
physique  and  equipment,  in  pro- 
fessional training  and  experience 
of  war,  in  that  quality  of  skilful 


16    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

and  cheerful  tenacity  against  odds 
which  distinguishes  the  veteran,  it 
was  probably  unrivalled  by  any 
body  of  troops  of  its  time.  The 
French,  who  gave  our  men  a  warm 
welcome,  dwell  always  on  their 
youth  and  good  spirits,  their  won- 
derful cleanness  and  healthiness, 
the  excellence  of  their  equipment, 
and  their  universal  courtesy. 

*'A  Argenteuil-Triage,"  writes  a 
French  infantryman  who  fought 
in  the  Retreat  and  on  the  Marne, 
*'nous  croisons  un  train  de  fan- 
tassins  anglais;  figures  rasees,  ou- 
vertes,  enfantines,  riant  de  toutes 
leurs  dents.  lis  sont  reluisants  de 
proprete.  Nous  nous  acclamons 
reciproquement.'*  (Sept.  2/14: 
Carnet  de  Route;  Roujons.) 

At  Bucy-le-long  the  French  re- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     17 

lieve  the  English.  It  is  a  matter  of 
outposts.  "De  deux  cents  metres 
en  deux  cents  metres,  un  groupe  de 
six  Anglais  est  couche  a  plat  ventre 
dans  les  betteraves,  en  bordure 
d'un  chemin.  lis  se  dressent  et 
nous  allons  prendre  leurs  places 
en  admirant  ces  beaux  soldats, 
bien  equipes,  silencieux,  et  qui 
ont  des  couvertures."  {Ibid.y  Oct. 
6/14.) 

Such  opinions  were  worth  much. 
For  though  it  is  a  great  thing  to 
be  welcomed,  as  our  men  were  wel- 
comed, by  a  whole  people,  to  have 
the  hearty  professional  approval 
of  its  soldiers  is  a  greater  thing  still. 

The  Expeditionary  Force,  thus 
landed  in  France,  was  organized 
in  two  army  corps  —  the  First, 
consisting  of  the  First  and  Second 


18    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

Divisions,  under  Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral  Sir  Douglas  Haig;  the  second, 
consisting  of  the  Third  and  Fifth 
Divisions,  under  Lieutenant-Gen- 
eral  Sir  James  Grierson,  who  was 
succeeded,  on  his  sudden  and  much 
lamented  death,  by  General  Sir 
Horace  Smith-Dorrien.  General 
AUenby  commanded  the  cavalry 
division,  consisting  of  the  First, 
Second,  Third,  and  Fourth  Cavalry 
Brigades,  and  the  Fifth  Cavalry 
Brigade  was  commanded  inde- 
pendently by  Brigadier-General 
Sir  Philip  Chetwode.  By  the  eve- 
ning of  Friday,  August  21,  the 
concentration  was  practically  com- 
plete, and  during  Saturday  the  22d 
the  Force  moved  up  to  its  position 
on  the  left  or  western  extremity  of 
the  French  line.   (Plan  1.) 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     19 

The  general  situation  in  this 
region,  as  it  was  known  at  the  mo- 
ment to  the  leaders  of  the  Allies, 
may  be  briefly  stated.  It  was  at 
last  plain,  after  much  uncertainty, 
that  the  first  great  shock  and  colli- 
sion of  forces  was  destined  to  take 
place  in  this  northern  area.  It  was 
plain,  also,  that  Belgium,  for  some 
time  to  come,  was  out  of  the 
scheme.  Liege  had  fallen,  and  with 
it  how  many  hopes  and  predictions 
of  the  engineer!  Brussels  was  oc- 
cupied; and  the  Belgian  field  army 
was  retiring  to  shelter  under  the 
ramparts  of  Antwerp.  Except  for 
Namur,  there  was  nothing  in  Bel- 
gium north  of  the  Allied  line  to 
stop  the  German  advance.  Von 
Kluck  and  Von  Buelow,  with  the 
First  and  Second  German  Armies, 


20    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

were  marching  without  opposition 
towards  the  French  frontier  — 
Von  Kluck  towards  the  south- 
west and  Von  Buelow  towards  the 
crossings  of  the  Sambre.  By  the 
evening  of  the  20th,  Von  Buelow's 
guns  were  bombarding  Namur.  So 
much  was  known  to  the  leaders 
of  the  AlUes :  of  the  strength  of  the 
advancing  armies  they  knew  Httle. 
To  oppose  these  two  armies  — 
for  of  the  seven  German  armies 
already  in  position  we  shall  con- 
sider only  these  two  —  the  Allies 
were  disposed  as  follows:  Directly 
in  the  route  of  Von  Buelow's  army, 
should  he  pass  Namur,  lay  the 
Fifth  French  Army,  under  General 
Lanrezac,  with  its  left  resting  on 
the  river  Sambre  at  Charleroi,  and 
its  right  in  the  fork  of  the  Meuse 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     21 

and  the  Sambre.  This  army,  it 
should  be  noted,  made  a  junction 
in  the  river  fork  with  another 
French  Army,  the  Fourth,  under 
General  Ruffey,  which  lay  off  to 
the  south  along  the  Middle  Meuse, 
watching  the  Ardennes.  On  the 
left  of  the  Fifth  French  Army, 
along  a  line  presently  to  be  de- 
fined, lay  the  British  Expeditionary 
Force,  facing,  as  it  seemed,  with 
equal  directness,  the  line  of  ad- 
vance of  the  army  of  Von  Kluck. 
Subsidiary  to  the  Fifth  French 
Army  and  the  British  Force  were 
two  formations,  available  for  sup- 
port :  a  cavalry  corps  of  three  divi- 
sions under  General  Sordet,  sta- 
tioned to  the  south  of  Maubeuge, 
and,  out  to  the  west,  with  its  base 
at  Arras,  a  corps  of  two  reserve 


22    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

divisions  under  General  D'Amade. 
Both  these  formations  will  be 
heard  of  during  the  subsequent  op- 
erations, and  it  is  important  to  re- 
mark that  General  D'Amade's  two 
divisions  were  at  this  time,  and 
throughout  the  first  days  of  the 
fighting,  the  only  considerable 
body  of  Allied  troops  in  the  eighty 
miles  of  territory  between  the  Brit- 
ish and  the  sea. 

The  line  occupied  by  the  British 
ran  due  east  from  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Conde  along  the  straight 
of  the  Conde-Mons  Canal,  round 
the  loop  which  the  canal  makes 
north  of  Mons,  and  then,  with  a 
break,  patrolled  by  cavalry,  turned 
back  at  almost  a  right  angle  to- 
wards the  southeast  of  the  direction 
of  the  Mons-Beaumont  road.    The 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     23 

whole  of  the  canal  line,  including 
the  loop  round  Mons,  —  a  front  of 
nearly  twenty  miles,  —  was  held 
by  the  Second  Army  Corps,  and 
the  First  Army  Corps  lay  off  to 
its  right,  holding  the  southeastern 
line  to  a  point  about  nine  miles 
from  Mons.  There  being  no  in- 
fantry reserves  available  in  this 
small  force.  General  Allenby's 
cavalry  division  was  employed  to 
act  on  the  flank  or  in  support  of 
any  threatened  part  of  the  line. 
The  forward  reconnaissance  was 
entrusted  to  the  Fifth  Cavalry 
Brigade,  assisted  by  some  squad- 
rons from  General  Allenby's  divi- 
sion, and  some  of  its  detachments 
penetrated  as  far  north  as  Soignies, 
nine  miles  on  the  way  to  Brussels. 
In  the  occasional  encounters  which 


24    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

took  place  with  the  enemy's  Uhlans, 
to  the  north  and  east,  our  cavalry 
had  always  the  best  of  it;  then,  as 
always  in  this  war,  when  the  op- 
portunity has  occurred,  mounted 
or  dismounted,  they  have  proved 
themselves  the  better  arm.  Their 
reconnaissance  was  more  than  sup- 
plemented by  four  squadrons  of  the 
Royal  Flying  Corps  under  the  di- 
rection of  Major-General  Sir  David 
Henderson. 

Throughout  the  Saturday  our 
men  entrenched  themselves,  the 
North-Countrymen  among  them 
finding  in  the  chimney-stacks  and 
slag-heaps  of  this  mining  district 
much  to  remind  them  of  home.  The 
line  they  held  was  clearly  not  an 
easy  line  to  defend.  No  salient 
ever  is,  and  a  glance  at  the  map 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     25 

will  show  that  this  was  no  common 
salient.  To  the  sharp  apex  of  Mons 
was  added,  as  an  aggravation,  the 
loop  of  the  canal.  It  was  never- 
theless the  best  line  available,  and, 
once  adopted,  had  been  occupied 
with  that  double  view  both  to  de- 
fence and  to  attack  which  a  good 
commander  has  always  before  him. 
The  first  object,  when  an  enemy  of 
unknown  strength  attacks,  is  to 
hold  him  and  gain  time;  the  line  of 
the  canal  supplies  just  the  obstacle 
required;  it  was  therefore  held,  in 
spite  of  the  salient,  and  arrange- 
ments made  for  a  withdrawal  of 
the  Second  Corps  should  the  salient 
become  untenable.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  enemy  should  be  beaten 
back,  the  Second  Corps,  pivoting 
northeast   on   Mons,   could   cross 


26    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

the  canal  and  move  forward  in  line 
with  the  First  Corps,  already  in 
position  for  such  an  advance.  If, 
finally,  —  for  a  commander,  like 
a  good  parent,  must  provide  for 
everything,  —  a  general  retirement 
should  become  necessary,  the 
British  Commander-in-Chief  had 
decided  to  rest  his  right  flank 
on  Maubeuge,  twelve  miles  south 
of  Mons:  and  here  was  his  First 
Corps  ready  for  it,  clustered  about 
the  roads  that  lead  towards  Mau- 
beuge, and  able,  from  this  advan- 
tage, to  cover  the  retirement  of  the 
Second  Corps,  which  had  fewer 
facilities  in  this  way,  and  would 
have  farther  to  travel.  Tactically 
the  arrangements  were  as  good  as 
could  be  made. 

When  we  come  to  the  strength 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     27 

and  direction  of  the  enemy's  at- 
tack, we  are  on  more  doubtful 
ground.  His  strength  on  the  Brit- 
ish front  was  estimated  at  the  time, 
according  to  all  the  available  in- 
formation, both  French  and  Eng- 
lish, to  be  at  most  two  army  corps, 
with  perhaps  one  cavalry  division, 
which  would  have  made  an  equal 
battle;  and  it  was  not  unnaturally 
supposed  that  he  would  attack  in 
the  general  direction  of  his  advance ; 
that  is,  from  the  northeast.  From 
an  attack  in  this  strength  and  from 
this  direction  we  had  nothing  to 
fear.  As  it  turned  out,  however, 
both  the  estimate  of  strength  and 
the  supposition  of  direction  were 
inaccurate.  The  enemy,  making 
full  use  of  the  wooded  country  in 
tjiese  parts,  which  gave  excellent 


28    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

concealment,  and  strong  enough  to 
throw  his  forces  wide,  was,  as  we 
shall  see,  engaged  on  something 
much  more  ambitious;  a  move- 
ment which,  had  it  succeeded  (as 
against  any  other  troops  it  might 
well  have  succeeded),  would  have 
brought  disaster  on  the  whole  Al- 
lied army. 

At  what  hour  precisely  the  Ger- 
mans began  their  attack  on  the 
Mons  position  is  uncertain.  Some 
say  at  dawn,  others  just  after  noon. 
What  is  certain  is  that  between  12 
and  1  P.M.  on  Sunday  the  23d, 
some  of  the  men  of  the  Royal  West 
Kents,  in  support  on  the  outskirts 
of  Mons,  were  having  a  sing-song 
and  watching  the  people  home 
from  church,  and,  feeling  quite  at 
their  ease,  had  sent  their  shirts  and 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     29 

socks  out  to  wash,  for  all  the  world 
as  if  on  manoeuvres.  It  is  an  inter- 
esting little  scene,  and  one  which 
would  have  seemed  incomprehen- 
sible to  the  Germans,  who  by  this 
time  pictured  our  little  army  cow- 
ering in  its  positions.  The  abrupt- 
ness with  which  the  scene  changed 
is  no  less  characteristic.  When  it 
was  reported  that  the  enemy  had 
turned  up  "at  last"  and  that  "A" 
company  was  hard-pressed  at  the 
canal,  there  was  no  more  thought 
of  sing-songs  nor  even  of  the  dinner 
"which  the  orderlies  had  just  gone 
to  fetch";  socks  and  shirts  ap- 
peared as  if  by  miracle;  and  when 
the  "fall-in"  went,  every  man  was 
there,  equipped  and  ready  for  any- 
thing. It  is  an  ordinary  incident, 
and  for  that  reason  important;  in 


30    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

any  institution,  whether  it  be  an 
army  or  a  household,  it  is  the  or- 
dinary incidents  that  count.  It  is 
typical  of  the  spirit  of  an  army 
which  has  puzzled  many  even  of 
its  admirers  by  its  strange  combi- 
nation of  qualities:  boyish  ease  and 
hilarity  coupled  with  manly  forti- 
tude and  discipline,  and  a  most 
perfect  and  unassailable  confidence 
in  its  weapons,  its  leaders,  and  it- 
self. 

The  attack  had  most  certainly 
begun;  and  it  began,  as  was  ex- 
pected, at  the  weakest  and  most 
critical  point  of  the  line,  the  canal 
loop,  which  was  held  by  the  Third 
Division.  This  division  had  the 
heaviest  share  of  the  fighting 
throughout  the  day,  maintaining, 
longer  than  seemed  humanly  pos- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     31 

sible,  a  hopeless  position  against 
hopeless  odds,  the  Second  Royal 
Irish  and  Fourth  Middlesex  of  the 
Eighth  Brigade,  and  the  Fourth 
Royal  Fusiliers  of  the  Ninth  Bri- 
gade, particularly  distinguishing 
themselves.  The  bridges  over  the 
canal,  which  our  men  held,  after 
some  preliminary  shelling,  were 
attacked  by  infantry  debouching 
from  the  low  woods  which  at  this 
point  came  down  to  within  three 
hundred  or  four  hundred  yards  of 
the  canal.  These  woods  were  of 
great  assistance  to  the  enemy, 
both  here  and  at  other  points  of 
the  canal,  in  providing  cover  for 
their  infantry  and  machine-guns. 
The  odds  were  very  heavy.  One 
company  of  the  Royal  Fusiliers, 
holding    the    Nimy    Bridge,    was 


32    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

attacked  at  one  time  by  as  many 
as  four  battalions.  The  enemy  at 
first  came  on  in  masses,  and  suf- 
fered severely  in  consequence.  It 
was  their  first  experience  of  the 
British  "fifteen  rounds  a  minute/' 
and  it  told.  They  went  down  in 
bundles  —  our  men  delighting  in  a 
form  of  musketry  never  contem- 
plated in  the  Regulations.  To 
men  accustomed  to  hitting  bob- 
bing heads  at  eight  hundred  yards 
there  was  something  monstrous 
and  incredible  in  the  German  ad- 
vance. They  could  scarcely  be- 
heve  their  eyes;  such  targets  had 
never  appeared  to  them  even  in 
their  dreams.  Nor  were  our  ma- 
chine-guns idle.  In  this,  as  in 
many  other  actions  that  day  and  in 
the  days  that  followed,  our  ma- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     33 

chine-guns  were  handled  with  a 
skill  and  devotion  which  no  one 
appreciated  more  than  the  enemy. 
Two  of  the  first  Victoria  Crosses 
of  the  war  were  won  by  machine- 
gunners  in  this  action  of  the 
bridges:  Lieutenant  Dease,  of  the 
Royal  Fusiliers,  who,  though  five 
times  wounded,  —  and,  as  it  turned 
out,  mortally  wounded,  —  contin- 
ued to  work  his  gun  on  the  Nimy 
Bridge  until  the  order  came  for  re- 
tirement, and  he  was  carried  off; 
and  Private  Godley,  of  the  Royal 
Scots  Fusiliers,  who,  lower  down 
the  loop,  at  the  Ghlin  Bridge,  in 
the  face  of  repeated  assaults,  kept 
his  gun  in  action  throughout. 

The  attack  had  now  spread  along 
the  whole  line  of  the  canal;  but  ex- 
cept at  the  loop  the  enemy  could 


34    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

make  no  impression.  There,  how- 
ever, numbers  told  at  last,  and 
about  the  middle  of  the  afternoon 
the  Third  Division  was  ordered  to 
retire  from  the  salient,  and  the 
Fifth  Division  on  its  left  directed 
to  conform.  Bridges  were  blown 
up  —  the  Royal  Engineers  vying 
with  the  other  services  in  the 
race  for  glory :  and  by  the  night  of 
the  23d,  after  various  vicissitudes, 
the  Second  Army  Corps  had  fallen 
back  as  far  as  the  line  Montreuil- 
Wasmes-Paturages-Frameries. 
That  the  retirement,  though  suc- 
cessful, was  expensive,  is  not  to  be 
wondered  at,  when  it  is  remem- 
bered that  throughout  this  action, 
as  we  now  know,  the  Second  Army 
Corps  was  outnumbered  by  three 
to  one.   All  ranks,  however,  were 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     35 

in  excellent  spirits.  Allowing  for 
handicaps,  they  felt  that  they  had 
proved  themselves  the  better  men. 
It  was  a  feeling  which  was  to  be 
severely  tried  in  the  next  few  days. 
At  5  P.M.  on  Smiday  the  23d,  as 
the  Second  Corps  was  withdrawing 
from  the  canal,  the  British  Com- 
mander-in-Chief received  a  most 
unexpected  telegraph  from  General 
Joffre,  the  Generalissimo  of  the 
Allied  armies,  to  the  effect  that  at 
least  three  German  army  corps  were 
moving  against  the  British  front, 
and  that  a  fourth  corps  was  en- 
deavouring to  outflank  him  from 
the  west.  He  was  also  informed 
that  the  Germans  had  on  the  pre- 
vious day  captured  the  crossings  of 
th^  Sambre  between  Charleroi  and 
Namur,  and  that  the  French  on  his 


36    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

right  were  retiring.  In  other  words, 
Namur,  the  defensive  pivot  of  the 
Anglo-French  Hne,  on  the  resist- 
ance of  which  —  if  only  for  a  few 
days  —  the  Allied  strategy  had 
depended,  had  fallen  almost  at  a 
blow.  By  Saturday  the  Germans 
had  left  Namur  behind,  and  in 
numbers  far  exceeding  French  pre- 
dictions had  seized  the  crossings 
of  the  Sambre  and  Middle  Meuse 
and  were  hammering  at  the  junc- 
tion of  the  Fifth  and  Fourth 
French  Armies  in  the  river-fork. 
The  junction  was  pierced,  and  the 
French,  unexpectedly  and  over- 
whelmingly assaulted  both  in  front 
and  flank,  could  do  nothing  but 
retire.  By  5  p.m.  on  the  Sunday, 
when  the  message  was  received  at 
British  Headquarters,  the  French 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     37 

had  been  retiring  for  anywhere 
from  ten  to  twelve  hours.  The 
British  Army  was  for  the  moment 
isolated.  Standing  forward  a  day's 
march  from  the  French  on  its 
right,  faced  and  engaged  by  three 
German  corps  in  front,  and  already 
threatened  by  a  fourth  corps  on  its 
left,  it  seemed  a  force  marked  out 
for  destruction. 

In  the  British  Higher  Command, 
however,  there  was  no  flurry.  There 
is  a  thing  called  British  phlegm. 

The  facts  of  the  case,  though 
unwelcome,  were  laconically  ac- 
cepted. Over  General  Headquar- 
ters brooded  a  clubroom  calm.  Air- 
men were  sent  up  to  confirm  the 
French  report,  in  the  usual  manner, 
and  arrangements  were  quietly  and 
methodically  made  for  a  retirement 


38    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

towards  the  prearranged  Mau- 
beuge- Valenciennes  line.  The  hard- 
pressed  Second  Corps,  which  had 
farther  to  march,  was  the  first  to 
move.  Early  on  the  24th  it  was 
marching  south  towards  Dour  and 
Quarouble,  covered  by  the  First 
Corps,  which  had  been  much  less 
taxed,  and  was  favourably  placed 
to  threaten  the  German  left.  This 
covering  demonstration  was  well 
carried  out  by  the  Second  Division, 
supported  by  the  massed  artillery 
of  the  corps.  The  retirement  of  the 
Second  Corps,  however,  even  with 
this  assistance,  was  not  made  with- 
out much  difficulty.  By  the  night 
of  the  23d  the  enemy  were  already 
crossing  the  canal,  and  pouring 
down  on  the  villages  to  the  south. 
Several    rear-guard    actions    were 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     39 

fought  here  on  the  morning  of  the 
24th,  in  which  infantry  and  artil- 
lery equally  distinguished  them- 
selves at  Wasmes  with  notable  suc- 
cess and  much  loss  to  the  enemy; 
but,  as  every  hour  passed,  the  inten- 
tion of  the  enemy  to  outflank  from 
the  northwest  became  more  evi- 
dent. Desperate  fighting  took  place, 
the  First  Norfolks,  First  Cheshires, 
and  One  Hundred  and  Nineteenth 
Battery,  R.F.A.,  detached  as  a 
flank  guard  under  Colonel  Ballard, 
of  the  Norfolks,  holding  the  ridge 
from  Audregnies  to  Flouges  for 
several  hours  in  the  teeth  of  over- 
whelming opposition.  To  this  little 
band,  which  cheerfully  sacrificed 
itself,  belongs  the  principal  credit 
for  holding  up  the  turning  move- 
ment of  the  enemy  during  the  re- 


40    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

tirement  of  the  24th.  They  made 
a  splendid  stand,  and  six  hundred 
of  the  Cheshires  never  got  away. 
Our  cavalry,  fortunately,  were 
able  to  help  also,  and  at  once;  for 
by  an  act  of  great  foresight,  long 
before  the  news  arrived  of  a  turn- 
ing movement,  Sir  John  French 
had  transferred  his  cavalry  division 
from  the  right  flank  to  the  left. 
They  were  in  position  there  by  the 
Sunday  morning,  and  in  the  sub- 
sequent retirement  did  everything 
that  men  and  horses  could  do  to 
relieve  the  pressure.  The  dramatic 
action  of  General  de  Lisle's  cavalry 
brigade  at  Audregnies,  where  the 
Fifth  Division  was  hard-pressed, 
is  one  of  the  best-known  incidents 
of  this  day's  fighting,  not  only  be- 
cause it  succeeded,  though  at  a 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     41 

heavy  cost,  in  delaying  the  enemy, 
but  because  it  gave  occasion  to  one 
of  the  most  heroic  performances  of 
the  Retreat. 

When  the  action  was  drawing  to 
a  close,  and  men,  horses,  and  bat- 
teries were  being  withdrawn,  Cap- 
tain Francis  Grenfell,  of  the  Ninth 
Lancers,  observed  that  the  One 
Hundred  and  Nineteenth  Battery, 
R.F.A.,  was  in  difficulties.  All  the 
horses  of  the  battery  had  been 
killed,  most  of  its  personnel  had 
been  killed  or  wounded,  and  it 
looked  as  if  the  guns  would  have 
to  be  left.  Captain  Grenfell,  though 
himself  wounded,  determined  to 
help,  and  rode  out  to  look  for  a 
way  of  retreat  for  the  guns.  Hav- 
ing found  it,  to  show  how  little  a 
cavalryman  need  care  for  death,  he 


42    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

rode  his  horse  back,  under  a  tem- 
pest of  fire,  at  a  walk,  and  called 
for  volunteers  from  the  Lancers, 
reminding  them  that  "the  Ninth 
had  never  failed  the  gunners." 
After  such  an  example  the  re- 
sponse could  be  nothing  but  brisk. 
He  returned  with  his  volunteers 
("eleven  ofiicers  and  some  forty 
men"),  and  under  a  fierce  and  in- 
cessant fire  the  guns  were  man- 
handled into  safety.  For  this  fine 
action  Captain  Grenfell  and  the 
battery  commander — Major  Alex- 
ander —  were  each  awarded  the 
Victoria  Cross.  It  is  one  of  many 
illustrations  furnished  by  the  Re- 
treat of  the  camaraderie  of  the 
various  arms. 

After  a  short  halt  and  partial  en- 
trenchment   on    the    line    Dour- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     43 

Quarouble,  to  enable  the  First 
Corps  to  break  off  its  demonstra- 
tions, the  retreat  of  the  Second 
Corps  was  resumed;  and  by  the 
evening  of  the  24th  the  whole 
army  had  reached  the  prearranged 
line  Jenlain-Bavai-Maubeuge  — • 
the  Second  Corps  to  the  west  of 
Bavai,  and  the  First  Corps  to  the 
right.  The  right  was  protected  by 
the  fortress  of  Maubeuge,  the  left 
by  the  cavalry,  operating  outwards, 
and  by  the  Nineteenth  Infantry 
Brigade,  which  had  been  brought 
up  in  the  nick  of  time  from  the 
lines  of  communication,  and  had 
acted  throughout  the  day  in  support 
of  the  exposed  flank  of  the  Second 
Corps. 

It  had   been   intended   by   the 
British     Commander-in-Chief    to 


44    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

make  a  stand  on  the  Maubeuge 
line,  and  if  the  first  calculations  of 
the  enemy's  strength  and  inten- 
tions had  proved  correct,  it  is  pos- 
sible that  a  great  battle  might 
have  been  fought  here,  and  con- 
tinued by  the  French  armies  along 
the  whole  fortress  line  of  northern 
France.  Even  as  it  was,  the  temp- 
tation to  linger  at  Maubeuge  must 
have  been  strong;  it  offered  such 
an  inviting  buttress  to  our  right 
flank,  and  filled  so  comfortably 
that  dangerous  gap  between  our 
line  and  the  French.  The  tempta- 
tion, to  which  a  weaker  commander 
might  have  succumbed,  was  re- 
sisted. "The  French  were  still  re- 
tiring," says  the  despatch,  "and  I 
had  no  support  except  such  as  was 
afforded  by  the  fortress  of  Mau- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     45 

beuge;  and  the  determined  at- 
tempts of  the  enemy  to  get  round 
my  left  flank  assured  me  that  it 
was  his  intention  to  hem  me  against 
that  place  and  surround  me.  I  felt 
that  not  a  moment  must  be  lost  in 
retiring  to  another  position." 

Early  on  the  25th,  accordingly, 
the  whole  British  Army  set  out 
on  the  next  stage  of  its  retreat. 
Its  function  in  the  general  Allied 
strategy  was  now  becoming  clear. 
It  was  not  merely  fighting  its  own 
battles.  Situated  as  it  was  on  the 
left  flank  of  the  retiring  French 
Armies,  it  had  become  in  effect  the 
left  flank-guard  of  the  Allied  line, 
committed  to  its  retirement,  and  to 
the  protection  of  that  retirement, 
to  the  end.  The  turning  movement 
from  the  west,  at  first  local  and 


46    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

partial,  had  suddenly  acquired  a 
strategic  significance.  It  threat- 
ened not  merely  the  British  Army, 
but  the  whole  Allied  strategy  of 
the  Retreat.  Could  the  British  re- 
sist it.f^  Could  they,  at  the  least, 
delay  it?  These  were  the  questions 
which  the  French  leaders  asked 
themselves,  with  some  anxiety,  as 
they  retired  with  their  armies  from 
day  to  day,  and  waited  for  the 
counter-turn  which  was  to  come. 
For,  as  we  now  know,  behind  the 
retiring  and  still  intact  French 
Armies,  to  the  south  and  east  of 
Paris,  movements  were  shaping, 
forces  were  forming,  which  were  to 
change  the  face  of  things  in  this 
western  corner.  Could  the  British 
hold  out  till  these  movements  were 
ripe.f*    It  was  a  momentous  ques- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     47 

tion.  No  more  momentous  ques- 
tion has  been  asked  for  a  hundred 
years.  The  answer,  so  far,  had 
been  affirmative. 

On  this  day,  the  25th,  from  very 
early  in  the  morning,  the  two  corps 
marched  south  on  each  side  of  the 
great  Forest  of  Mormal,  the  First 
Corps  to  the  right  and  the  Second 
to  the  left,  as  one  faces  the  enemy. 
The  position  chosen  for  the  next 
stand  was  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Le  Cateau,  on  the  line  Cambrai-Le 
Cateau-Landrecies,  and  while  the 
army  was  marching  towards  it, 
civilian  labour  was  employed  to 
prepare  and  entrench  the  ground. 
On  this  morning,  also,  the  infantry 
of  the  Fourth  Division,  which  had 
arrived  at  Le  Cateau  on  the  23d 
and   24th,    became    available   for 


48    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

service,  bringing  a  welcome  addi- 
tion to  our  strength  of  eleven  bat- 
talions. They  were  immediately 
sent  forward,  and,  facing  north- 
west between  Solesmes  and  the 
Cambrai-Le  Cateau  road,  materi- 
ally assisted  the  retirement  of  the 
Second  Corps.  For  both  corps  it 
was  a  day  of  terrible  marching, 
along  roads  crowded  with  trans- 
port and  —  particularly  on  the 
eastern  route  —  packed  with  refu- 
gees. For  marching  in  a  retreat 
has  this  fundamental  disadvantage, 
that  the  men  move  behind  their 
transport,  and  (in  friendly  country) 
with  all  the  civilians  of  the  country- 
side about  their  feet.  In  such  con- 
ditions a  steady  pace  is  the  last 
thing  to  be  hoped  for.  Checking 
—  the  curse  of  tired  men  —  from 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     49 

being  the  exception  becomes  the 
rule;  while  the  hours  crawl  on,  and 
the  boots  tell,  and  the  packs  tell, 
and  the  eye  grows  glazed  with 
staring  at  the  men  in  front,  and 
even  the  rifle,  that  "best  friend," 
seems  duller  and  heavier  than  a 
friend  should  be  —  the  heaviest 
nine  pounds  in  the  world.  It  is 
calculated  that  on  the  25th  the 
various  units  of  the  Second  Corps 
marched,  under  these  most  trying 
conditions,  anything  from  twenty 
to  thirty-five  miles.  By  this  time, 
also,  the  continual  retirement  was 
having  its  effect  on  the  men's 
spirits.  To  the  rank  and  file,  who 
necessarily  know  nothing  of  high 
strategy,  and  see  only  what  is  be- 
fore their  eyes,  the  Retreat  carried 
little  of  that  high  significance  which 


50    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

we  attach  to  it,  but  much  of  weari- 
ness and  distaste.  Some  ghmmer- 
ing  of  an  idea  that  we  were  "lead- 
ing the  Germans  into  a  trap" 
cheered  men  up  here  and  there; 
some  rumours  of  Russian  victories 
raised  the  old  jokes  about "  Berlin  " ; 
but  for  the  most  part  they  marched 
and  fought  uncomprehending,  wel- 
coming their  turn  of  rear  guard 
as  a  relief,  because  it  gave  some 
chance  of  fighting  and  turned  their 
faces  to  the  north. 

The  Second  Corps  reached  their 
appointed  line  on  the  Cambrai-Le 
Cateau  road  as  night  was  falling, 
and,  under  a  cold,  steady  rain, 
which  had  succeeded  the  blazing 
heat  of  the  day,  proceeded  to  im- 
prove the  trenches  which  they 
found  there.  They  had  had  an  ex- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     51 

hausting  march,  but  little  fighting 
or  interruption.  The  First  Corps 
was  delayed  and  did  not  reach  the 
allotted  position;  but  was  scat- 
tered by  the  evening  over  an  area 
at  some  points  as  many  as  thirty 
miles  from  the  Second  Corps,  and 
nowhere  nearer  than  Landrecies, 
eight  miles  from  Le  Cateau.  The 
difficulty  of  movement  had  been 
increased  by  the  convergence  of 
French  troops  retiring  from  the 
Sambre,  who  cut  across  our  hne  of 
march.  The  enemy  pressure  was 
continued  by  fresh  troops  well  into 
the  night.  The  engagement  of  the 
Second  Division  south  and  east  of 
Maroilles,  and  the  fight  of  the 
Fourth  (Guards')  Brigade  at  Lan- 
drecies, are  the  two  main  inci- 
dents in  this  difficult  night's  work. 


52    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

About  the  fighting  near  Maroilles 
we  have  Httle  information  except 
that  it  seemed  serious  enough  to 
justify  the  British  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  asking  for  help  from  the 
French.  In  response  to  his  urgent 
request  two  French  reserve  divi- 
sions attached  to  the  Fifth  French 
Army  on  our  right  eventually 
came  up,  and  by  diverting  the  at- 
tention of  the  enemy  enabled  Sir 
Douglas  Haig  to  effect  a  skilful 
extrication  from  an  awkward  po- 
sition made  still  more  awkward  by 
the  darkness  of  night.  One  inci- 
dent of  the  fighting  near  Maroilles 
has,  indeed,  slipped  into  the  light 
of  day  with  regard  to  a  unit  of  the 
Second  Division:  a  little  rear- 
guard action  of  the  First  Berks, 
near  a  bridge  over  the  Petit  Helpe 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     53 

which  it  was  important  to  hold. 
They  were  on  their  way  back  to 
it,  stumbling  in  the  dark  along  a 
greasy,  narrow  causeway,  with  a 
deep  ditch  on  each  side,  which  led 
to  the  bridge.  "The  Germans,  as 
it  turned  out,  had  already  forced 
the  bridge  and  were  in  the  act  of 
advancing  along  the  causeway; 
and  in  the  pitch  darkness  of  the 
night  the  two  forces  suddenly 
bumped  one  into  the  other.  Neither 
side  had  fixed  bayonets,  for  fear  of 
accidents  in  the  dark,  and  in  the 
scrimmage  which  followed  it  was 
chiefly  a  case  of  rifle-butts  and 
fists.  At  this  game  the  Germans 
proved  no  match  for  our  men,  and 
were  gradually  forced  back  to  the 
bridgehead,  where  they  were  held 
for  the  remainder  of  the  night." 


54    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

Early  in  the  morning  the  Germans 
withdrew,  and  the  First  Berks  fell 
back  on  the  rest  of  the  Second  Di- 
vision, along  the  road  to  Guise.  It 
was  a  very  complete  and  satisfac- 
tory little  affair. 

The  fight  at  Landrecies  by  the 
Fourth  (Guards')  Brigade  is  better 
known.  They  had  arrived  there, 
very  weary,  and  had  got  into  bil- 
lets; so  weary,  indeed,  that  the 
Commander-in-Chief  could  not  or- 
der them  farther  west,  to  fill  up 
the  gap  between  Le  Cateau  and 
Landrecies.  "The  men  were  ex- 
hausted, and  could  not  get  farther 
in  without  rest."  The  enemy,  how- 
ever, would  not  allow  them  this 
rest.  At  8.30  in  the  evening  came 
news  that  Germans  in  motor- 
lorries  were  coming  through  the 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     55 

Forest  of  Mormal  in  great  numbers, 
and  bearing  down  upon  the  town. 
The  town,  fortunately,  had  aheady 
been  put  into  a  hasty  state  of  de- 
fence: houses  loopholed,  machine- 
guns  installed,  barricades  erected, 
and  a  company  detailed  to  each  of 
the  many  exits.  It  is  said  that  the 
Germans  advanced  singing  French 
songs,  and  that  the  leading  ranks 
wore  French  uniforms,  for  a 
moment  deceiving  the  defenders. 
This  would  explain  the  sudden- 
ness of  the  collision,  for  the  Ger- 
mans and  British  were  fighting 
hand  to  hand  almost  at  once.  It 
was  a  fierce  fight  while  it  lasted, 
and,  with  short  respites,  went  on 
till  the  early  hours  of  the  morning; 
but  eventually  the  enemy  were 
beaten  off  with  great  loss.    It  is 


56    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

estimated  that  they  lost  in  this 
action  from  700  to  1000  men.  It 
must  be  allowed,  nevertheless,  in 
the  light  of  later  knowledge  that 
the  tactics  of  the  Germans  at 
Maroilles  and  Landrecies  were 
good.  A  few  battalions  —  for  it 
is  unlikely  that  they  amounted  to 
more  —  attacking  at  various  points 
under  cover  of  darkness  with  a 
great  show  of  vigour,  though  beaten 
off,  succeeded  in  conveying  the 
impression  to  the  British  com- 
manders in  this  part  of  the  field 
that  they  were  engaged  with  a 
considerable  force.  This  impres- 
sion once  conveyed,  the  main  ob- 
ject of  the  manoeuvre  had  been 
attained,  for  the  First  Corps  was 
kept  on  the  alert  all  night,  and 
effectually  prevented  either  from 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     57 

obtaining  rest  or  from  reaching  its 
appointed  destination  in  the  Brit- 
ish hne.  If  our  assumption  of  the 
enemy  numbers  is  correct,  it  was 
a  clever  piece  of  work,  well  con- 
ceived and  well  executed. 

The  crisis  of  the  Retreat  was 
now  approaching.  There  is  a  limit 
to  what  men  can  do,  and  it  seemed 
for  a  moment  as  if  this  limit  might 
be  reached  too  soon.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, seriously  consid- 
ering the  accumulating  strength  of 
the  enemy,  the  continued  retire- 
ment of  the  French,  his  exposed 
left  flank,  the  tendency  of  the 
enemy's  western  corps  to  envelop 
him,  and  above  all,  the  exhausted 
and  dispersed  condition  of  his 
troops,  decided  to  abandon  the  Le 
Cateau  position,  and  to  press  on 


58    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

the  Retreat  till  he  could  put  some 
substantial  obstacle,  such  as  the 
Somme  or  the  Oise,  between  his 
men  and  the  enemy,  behind  which 
they  might  reorganize  and  rest. 
He  therefore  ordered  his  corps 
commanders  to  break  off  whatever 
action  they  might  have  in  hand, 
and  continue  their  retreat  as  soon 
as  possible  towards  the  new  St. 
Quentin  line. 

The  First  Corps  was  by  this 
time  terribly  exhausted,  but,  on 
receiving  the  order,  set  out  from  its 
scattered  halting-places  in  the  early 
hours  of  the  26th. 

By  dawn  on  that  day  the  whole 
corps,  including  the  Fourth  Brigade 
at  Landrecies,  was  moving  south 
towards  St.  Quentin. 

The  order  to  retire  at  daybreak. 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     59 

on  which  the  First  Corps  was  now 
acting,  had  been  duly  received  by 
the  Second  Corps.  The  commander 
had  been  informed  that  the  retire- 
ment of  the  First  Corps  was  to  con- 
tinue simultaneously  and  that  three 
divisions  of  French  cavalry  under 
General  Sordet  were  moving  to- 
wards his  left  flank,  in  pursuance 
of  an  agreement  arrived  at  in 
a  personal  interview  between  the 
French  cavalry  commander  and 
the  British  Commander-in-Chief. 

Sir  H.  Smith-Dorrien  was  also 
informed  that  two  French  Ter- 
ritorial Divisions  under  General 
D'Amade  were  moving  up  to  sup- 
port Sordet. 

There  was  no  reason  to  suppose 
that  the  Second  Corps,  which  had 
not  been  so  much  harassed  by  the 


60    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH   ARMY 

enemy  on  its  march  south  as  the 
First  Corps,  was  not  equally  well 
able  to  obey  the  order  to  retreat. 

The  corps  commander,  however, 
judged  that  his  men  were  too  tired 
and  the  enemy  too  strong  to  effect 
such  a  retirement  as  he  was  directed 
to  carry  out. 

The  General's  reply  was  duly 
received  at  Headquarters.  The 
Commander-in-Chief  was  deeply 
engaged  in  concerting  plans  with 
the  French  Commander-in-Chief, 
his  Chief  of  the  Staff,  and  General 
Lanzerac  (the  commander  of  the 
Fifth  French  Army).  Orders  were 
immediately  sent  to  the  Second 
Corps,  informing  the  General  that 
any  delay  in  retiring  would  seri- 
ously compromise  the  plan  of  the 
Allied  operations,  and,  in  view  of 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     61 

the  general  situation,  might  entail 
fatal  results.  He  was  directed  to 
resume  his  retirement  forthwith, 
and,  to  assist  him,  the  cavalry  and 
Fourth  Division  were  placed  under 
his  orders. 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  confer- 
ence, no  positive  information  hav- 
ing been  received  of  the  commence- 
ment of  the  retirement,  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief himself  set  out 
for  Le  Cateau;  but  the  congestion 
of  the  roads  with  Belgian  refugees, 
etc.,  made  progress  so  slow  that  he 
had  not  accomplished  half  the 
distance  before  he  found  that  his 
orders  had  been  carried  out  and 
the  retirement  was  in  progress. 

During  the  early  part  of  the  day, 
however.  Sir  H.  Smith-Dorrien 
had,  for  the  reason  given  above, 


62    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

waited  at  the  Le  Cateau  position 
to  engage  the  pursuing  Germans. 
Of  the  three  divisions  of  infantry 
thus  engaged,  the  Fifth  lay  on  the 
right,  the  Third  in  the  centre,  and 
the  Fourth  faced  outwards  on  the 
left:  the  whole  occupying  the  ridge 
south  of  the  Cambrai-Le  Cateau 
road,  on  the  line  Haucourt-Caudry- 
Beaumont-Le  Cateau.  The  Nine- 
teenth Infantry  Brigade  was  in 
reserve  and  the  cavalry  operated 
on  the  flanks.  With  both  flanks 
exposed,  with  three  divisions  of 
infantry  to  the  enemy's  seven,  and 
faced  by  the  massed  artillery  of 
four  army  corps, —  an  odds  of  four 
or  five  to  one,  —  the  Second  Corps 
and  Fourth  Division  prepared  to 
make  a  stand.  A  few  hours'  sleep, 
and  at  dawn,  with  a  roar  of  guns, 
the  battle  opened. 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     63 

That  the  day  was  critical,  that 
it  was  all  or  nothing,  was  realized 
by  all  ranks.  Everything  was 
thrown  into  the  scale;  nothing  was 
held  back.  Regiments  and  batter- 
ies, with  complete  self-abandon- 
ment, faced  hopeless  duels  at  im- 
possible ranges;  brigades  of  cavalry 
on  the  flanks  boldly  threatened 
divisions;  and  in  the  half -shel- 
ter of  their  trenches  the  infan- 
try, withering  but  never  budging, 
grimly  dwindled  before  the  Ger- 
man guns.  It  was  our  first  expe- 
rience on  a  large  scale  of  modern 
artillery  in  mass.  For  the  first  six 
hours  the  guns  never  stopped.  To 
our  infantry  it  was  a  time  of  stub- 
born and  almost  stupefied  endur- 
ance, broken  by  lucid  intervals  of 
that  deadly  musketry  which  had 


64    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

played  such  havoc  with  the  Ger- 
mans at  Mons.  To  our  artillery  it 
was  a  duel,  and  perhaps  of  all  the 
displays  of  constancy  and  devotion 
in  a  battle  where  every  man  in 
every  arm  of  the  service  did  his 
best,  the  display  of  the  gunners 
was  the  finest.  For  they  accepted 
the  duel  quite  cheerfully,  and  made 
such  sport  with  the  enemy's  in- 
fantry that  even  their  masses 
shivered  and  recoiled.  By  midday, 
however,  many  of  our  batteries 
were  out  of  action,  and  the  enemy 
infantry  had  advanced  almost  to 
the  main  Cambrai-Le  Gateau  road, 
behind  which  our  men,  in  their 
pathetic  civilian  trenches,  were 
quietly  waiting. 

The  enemy  attacked  on  the  right 
of  the  Fifth  Division,  and  were  in 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     65 

the  act  of  turning  it  when  the  order 
came  to  retire.  This  necessary 
order,  for  a  gradual  retirement 
from  the  right,  was  issued  a  httle 
before  3  p.m.,  and  was  with  great 
difficulty  conveyed  to  all  parts 
of  the  line.  In  the  Fifth  Division 
several  companies,  in  covering  the 
retirement,  were  practically  wiped 
out.  The  story  of  "B"  Company 
of  the  Second  K.O.Y.L.I.  charg- 
ing the  enemy  with  its  nineteen 
remaining  men,  headed  by  its  com- 
mander, is  typical  of  the  spirit 
which  inspired  the  British  regi- 
ments. 

The  Third  Division  had  suffered 
comparatively  little  when  the  order 
reached  them,  and  were  justly 
priding  themselves  on  having  suc- 
cessfully repulsed  a  determined  at- 


66    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

tack  on  Caudry,  the  apex  of  the 
position. 

On  the  left  of  the  line  was  posted 
the  Fourth  Division  which  had 
come  in  by  train  the  previous  day, 
and  was  personally  placed  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief  in  the  posi- 
tion he  thought  best  to  cover  the 
retirement  of  the  Second  Corps. 

Owing  to  the  unexpected  turn  of 
events  at  Mons,  and  the  unfortu- 
nate delay  in  the  despatch  of  this 
division  from  England,  the  troops 
had  to  be  pushed  into  action  with- 
out a  moment's  delay,  and  before 
the  detrainment  of  their  artillery 
and  other  services  was  practically 
complete. 

On  the  morning  of  the  26th  they 
found  themselves  on  the  extreme 
western  flank  of  the  Allied  forces. 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     67 

and  splendidly  did  General  Snow 
and  his  gallant  men  carry  out  the 
difficult  and  dangerous  task  as- 
signed them. 

The  conduct  of  their  retirement 
was  no  less  efficient  than  their  gal- 
lant fighting.  Parts  of  this  division, 
however,  shared  the  fate  of  other 
units  in  the  line  engaged  in  cover- 
ing the  retirement,  and,  holding 
on  into  the  night,  either  retired  in 
the  darkness  (some  to  the  British 
lines,  others  through  the  German 
lines  to  the  sea)  or,  less  fortunate, 
were  cut  off,  captured,  or  destroyed. 
Many  adventures  befell  them,  and 
some  tragedies,  but  none  to  equal 
the  tragedy  of  the  First  Gordons, 
who  marched  in  the  darkness  into 
a;German  division  in  bivouac  some 
miles  south  of  the  battle-ground, 


68    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

and  were  shot  or  taken  prisoners 
almost  to  a  man. 

The  infantry  retirement,  though 
thus  partial  and  irregular,  was  pro- 
gressively carried  out  according  to 
orders,  and  by  four  o'clock  in  the 
afternoon  most  of  the  line  had  been 
cleared.  The  retirement  was  cov- 
ered by  the  artillery,  still  in  action 
with  the  same  unruffled  courage 
and  devotion  which  they  had  shown 
throughout  the  day,  and  there  is  no 
doubt  that  the  reluctance  of  the 
enemy  to  engage  in  an  energetic 
pursuit  was  partly  due  to  this 
splendid  opposition  of  our  gunners, 
as  well  as  to  the  undoubtedly 
heavy  losses  which  they  had  suf- 
fered from  our  rifle  and  shell  fire 
earlier  in  the  day.  At  any  rate,  the 
pursuit  was  not  pressed,  and  by 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     69 

nightfall,  after  another  long  and 
weary  march,  —  how  weary,  after 
such  a  day,  can  scarcely  be  ex- 
pressed, —  the  remains  of  the  Sec- 
ond Corps  and  the  Fourth  Divi- 
sion halted  and  bivouacked.  It  was 
pouring  with  rain,  but  many  slept 
where  they  halted,  by  the  roadside, 
too  utterly  worn  to  think  of  shelter. 
There  is  a  pendant  to  this  great 
action  of  the  26th  which  until  re- 
cently has  been  missing  from  its 
place;  and  it  has  been  a  matter  of 
much  wonder,  in  consequence,  how 
it  was  that  things  fell  out  as  they 
did  after  the  battle  of  Le  Cateau, 
the  weary  British  retiring  before 
a  numerous  and  victorious  enemy 
which  did  not  pursue.  It  was 
pointed  out,  indeed,  that  the  en- 
emy had  suffered  heavy  losses;  that 


70    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

they  were  tired  and  shaken  by  the 
unexpected  violence  of  the  British 
defence;  but  when  every  allowance 
had  been  made  for  the  efiFect  of 
weariness  and  loss,  it  was  plain 
that  some  other  reason  must  still 
be  found  to  account  for  a  decision 
so  repugnant  to  the  German  temper 
and  the  German  plans.  Reference 
has  already  been  made  to  the 
promise  made  by  Generals  Sordet 
and  D'Amade  to  the  British  Com- 
mander-in-Chief. If  history  has 
been  slow  to  record  it,  let  the  delay 
be  put  down  to  the  exigencies  of 
war.  The  enemy  were  not  only 
tired  and  shaken.  They  were  also 
threatened,  and  threatened,  as 
they  very  quickly  discovered,  in 
the  most  sensitive  tentacles  of  their 
advance.  It  was  about  4.30  on  the 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     71 

afternoon  of  the  26th  (so  the  story 
runs),  when  the  British  retirement 
had  been  in  progress  about  an 
hour,  that  a  furious  cannonading 
was  heard  out  towards  the  west. 
This  was  Sordet's  cavalry,  tired 
horses  and  all,  arrived  and  engag- 
ing the  German  right.  The  ex- 
planation was  confirmed  by  air- 
men later  in  the  day,  who  reported 
having  seen  large  bodies  of  French 
cavalry,  with  horse  artillery  and 
some  battalions  of  infantry,  driv- 
ing back  the  Germans  out  to- 
wards Cambrai.  General  Sordet 
and  his  cavalry,  aided  by  General 
D'Amade's  battalions,  which  had 
moved  out  from  their  station  at 
Arras,  were  able  to  inflict  upon  the 
outflankmg  German  right  a  blow 
which  recoiled  upon  the  whole  of 


72    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

the  First  German  Army,  and  by  its 
threatened  significance  more  than 
by  its  actual  strength  dominated 
the  pohcy  of  that  army  for  sev- 
eral days  to  come.  The  German  ad- 
vance wavered  and  paused,  and 
for  nearly  twenty-four  hours  the 
British  continued  their  retirement 
almost  unmolested. 

Whether  on  the  early  morning  of 
the  26th  the  left  of  the  British  line 
could  have  followed  the  example  of 
the  First  Corps  and  continued  its 
retreat,  is  a  question  which  cannot 
be  satisfactorily  settled  until  the 
whole  history  of  the  war  is  laid 
bare.  But  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  both  troops  and  commander 
richly  deserved  the  high  tribute 
paid  them  in  the  despatch  of  the 
British  Commander-in-Chief,  who, 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     73 

after  praising  the  behaviour  of  va- 
rious arms,  says:  — ■ 

"I  cannot  close  this  brief  ac- 
count of  the  glorious  stand  of  the 
British  troops  without  putting  on 
record  my  deep  appreciation  of  the 
valuable  services  rendered  by  Sir 
H.  Smith-Dorrien. 

"I  say  without  hesitation  that 
the  saving  of  the  left  wing  of  the 
army  under  my  command  on  the 
morning  of  the  26th  August  could 
never  have  been  accomplished  un- 
less a  commander  of  rare  and  un- 
usual coolness,  intrepidity,  and 
determination  had  been  present  to 
personally  conduct  the  operations.'* 

It  is  impossible  to  close  the  story 
of  this,  the  most  critical  time  of 
the  great  Retreat,  without  making 
mention  of  the  inestimable  services 


74    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

performed  by  the  British  cavalry 
under  General  Allenby.  The  moral 
superiority  which  they  had  so  ef- 
fectually established  over  the  hos- 
tile horsemen  during  the  enemy's 
first  advance  on  Mons,  was  main- 
tained and  increased  by  every  one 
of  the  many  trials  of  strength 
which  occurred  all  along  the  line 
between  smaller  and  greater  units 
of  the  two  opposing  cavalries.  In- 
variably in  all  these  encounters 
the  German  cavalry  were  driven 
behind  the  protection  of  their  in- 
fantry and,  thus  hampering  the  lat- 
ter's  advance,  assisted  our  troops 
to  make  good  their  retreat.  The 
quality  of  the  horses  and  equip- 
ment of  the  British,  their  unrivalled 
efficiency  in  dismounted  fighting 
and    in    knowledge     of     ground, 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     75 

coupled  with  their  intrepidity  and 
dash  whenever  the  smallest  op- 
portunity for  mounted  attack  pre- 
sented itself,  enabled  them  effectu- 
ally to  prevent  that  which  is  most 
dreaded  by  a  retreating  army  — 
the  enterprises  of  hostile  horsemen. 

No  praise  can  be  too  great  for 
the  British  cavalry  throughout 
this  drastic  initiation  into  the 
splendid  work  which  they  have  in- 
variably performed  throughout  the 
campaign. 

It  was  in  the  early  hours  of 
the  morning  of  the  27th  that  the 
commander  of  the  Second  Corps 
personally  reported  himseK  at 
Headquarters.  He  informed  the 
Commander-in-Chief  that  the  Sec- 
ond Corps  and  Fourth  Division 
had  suffered  heavily  and  were  very 


76    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

tired,  but  were  now  rapidly  regain- 
ing order  and  cohesion.  By  dawn 
every  available  staff  officer  was  en 
route  for  St.  Quentin,  and  hour 
after  hour,  at  their  posts  on  the 
line  of  the  Retreat,  shepherded 
the  troops  towards  their  units,  and 
the  longed-for  luxuries  of  food  and 
drink  and  news.  All  through  the 
morning  detachments  of  every  size 
and  every  conceivable  composition 
kept  filing  past  —  some  with  oflS- 
cers,  most  with  none  —  some  hob- 
bling and  silent,  others  whistling 
and  in  step  —  but  all  with  one 
accord  most  thoroughly  persuaded 
(such  are  the  fallacies  of  a  retreat) 
that  they  were  the  last  and  only 
survivors  of  their  respective  com- 
mands. Many,  after  a  brief  halt, 
had  marched  all  night,  and  up  to 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     77 

one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  they 
were  still  coming  in.  A  brief  rest, 
some  bread  and  coffee,  and  they 
were  off  once  more,  their  troubles 
almost  forgotten  in  the  pleasure  of 
rejoining  their  regiments  and  re- 
covering their  friends. 

The  general  Retreat,  which  the 
battle  of  Le  Cateau  had  so  danger- 
ously interrupted,  resumed  once 
more  its  normal  tenor.  Of  the  be- 
haviour of  the  men  during  this 
trying  period  it  is  difficult  to  speak 
with  moderation.  They  had  passed 
through  an  ordeal,  both  physical 
and  mental,  such  as  few  troops 
have  ever  had  to  face  in  their  first 
week  of  war;  and  had  displayed 
throughout  a  nobility  of  bearing 
and  demeanour  of  which  none  who 
observed  them  can  speak  even  now 


78    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

without  emotion.  Such  courage 
and  patience,  such  humorous  resig- 
nation and  cheerfulness  in  adver- 
sity, are  to  be  paralleled  only  in 
the  finest  armies  of  history. 

The  resumption  of  the  general 
Ketreat  and  the  restoration  of 
march  routine  among  the  forces  of 
the  British  left  had  one  immediate 
and  important  consequence.  It 
became  possible  to  deal  with  the 
chief  remaining  weakness  caused 
by  the  inability  of  the  First  Corps, 
as  already  pointed  out,  to  reach 
its  allotted  position  on  the  eve- 
ning of  the  25th.  The  First  Corps 
had  not  been  idle  while  the  Second 
Corps  fought;  though  never  heavily 
engaged,  it  had  been  perpetually 
harassed,  and  was  still,  on  August 
27,  suffering  from  the  wide  dis- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     79 

persion  of  its  forces  on  the  25  th.  It 
was  now  moving  south  as  best 
it  could  —  keepmg  direction,  but 
otherwise  marching  and  bivouack- 
ing by  brigades.  On  both  flanks, 
indeed,  throughout  these  early  days 
of  the  Retreat,  such  was  the  im- 
minence of  the  enemy,  and  such 
the  variety  of  fortunes  of  the  differ- 
ent brigades  —  and  even  battalions 
and  companies — of  the  same  divi- 
sion during  any  one  day,  that  no 
strict  uniformity  of  march  or  of 
line  could  be  looked  for.  It  speaks 
well  for  the  commanders  of  brigade 
and  regimental  units  that  so  un- 
usually high  a  discretionary  power 
was  exercised  so  well,  and  with  so 
little  miscarriage  either  of  in- 
dividual units  or  of  the  general 
scheme.   Some  mishaps,  of  course. 


80    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

there  were,  of  companies  and  bat- 
talions overtaken,  cut  off,  or  sur- 
prised. The  capture  of  the  greater 
part  of  the  Second  Munster  Fusi- 
hers  at  Bergues  on  the  26th  is  one 
of  these  incidents,  to  be  set  beside 
the  destruction  of  the  First  Gor- 
dons, as  part  of  the  tragic  waste 
inevitable  in  any  continuous  re- 
treat before  superior  numbers.  It 
is  memorable,  not  only  because, 
like  the  First  Gordons,  the  regi- 
ment involved  carried  a  famous 
name,  but  because  it  gave  occasion 
to  our  cavalry  to  show  once  more 
in  their  Retreat  their  devotion  to 
duty.  It  was  entirely  due  to  the 
skilful  and  audacious  dismounted 
action  of  two  troops  of  the  Fif- 
teenth Hussars  that  the  battered 
remnant  of  the  Munsters  —  about 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     81 

one  hundred  and  fifty  men  —  was 
saved  from  annihilation  or  sur- 
render. 

The  Second  Corps  was  still,  on 
August  27,  in  advance  of  the  First; 
but  in  both  corps  the  Retreat  con- 
tinued incessantly.  Sleep  was  cut 
down  to  a  minimum;  men  fed, 
drank,  and  slept  as  they  could,  and 
always,  when  they  rose  from  the 
roadside  and  stretched  themselves 
to  a  new  dawn,  the  word  was 
"March."  Their  chief  enemy  now 
was  not  the  Germans,  but  the  road, 
the  blazing  sun,  and  the  limits 
of  their  own  flesh  and  blood.  The 
worst,  however,  was  over.  By 
August  27/28  movement  by  divi- 
sions began  to  be  possible;  and  by 
August  28  movement  by  corps. 
By  August  28/29  the  whole  Army 


82    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

was  in  touch  once  more  on  the  hne 
Noyon-La  Fere,  and  on  Sunday  the 
29th,  for  the  first  time  for  eight 
days,  the  Army  actually  rested. 
It  is  a  day  they  are  never  likely  to 
forget.  While  the  men  rested,  their 
commanders  took  stock;  and  before 
the  march  was  resumed,  brigades 
and  divisions  had  been  reorganized, 
stragglers  restored,  and  deficien- 
cies of  men  and  material  ascer- 
tained and  noted.  The  reorganiza- 
tion was  completed  by  the  arrival 
of  Major-General  Pulteney,  and 
the  constitution  of  the  Fourth  Di- 
vision and  Nineteenth  Infantry 
Brigade  as  a  Third  Army  Corps 
under  his  command. 

The  reorganization  of  the  British 
Force  coincided  with  a  gratifying 
change  in  the  Allied  dispositions. 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     83 

The  British  Army  was  not  only  in 
touch  within  itself,  but  in  touch, 
also,  on  both  its  flanks,  with  the 
French;  on  the  right,  with  the 
Fifth  French  Army,  now,  after 
many  vicissitudes  and  much  hard 
fighting,  lying  behind  the  Oise 
from  La  Fere  to  Guise;  and  on  the 
left  with  a  new  French  Army,  still 
in  process  of  formation,  of  which 
the  nucleus  was  those  same  two 
divisions  of  infantry  and  three 
divisions  of  cavalry  which  General 
D'Amade  and  General  Sordet  had 
handled  so  much  to  our  advantage 
on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th,  and 
throughout  the  subsequent  retire- 
ment. This  Army  (to  be  called 
henceforth,  the  Sixth)  conscious  of 
some  mission  above  the  ordinary, 
and  daily  increasing  in  strength, 


84    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

lay  off,  on  the  29th,  to  the  north- 
west of  the  British  hne,  facing 
northeast  with  its  right  on  Roye. 
It  was  a  welcome  change,  removing 
none  too  soon  that  fear  of  isolation 
which  had  haunted  all  our  move- 
ments. The  situation  of  the  British, 
scars  and  bruises  notwithstanding, 
seemed  suddenly  almost  promising, 
and  with  their  flanks  secured,  for 
the  first  time  since  the  Retreat  be- 
gan, they  enjoyed  a  genuine  feeling 
of  relaxation.  It  was  a  feeling, 
happily,  which  the  enemy  at  the 
moment  was  unable  to  disturb. 
His  strength  was  diverted  to  the 
two  French  Armies,  and  except  for 
some  cavalry  actions,  in  which  our 
troops  as  usual  were  completely 
successful,  there  was  little  activity 
on  the  British  front.  On  the  morn- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     85 

ing  of  the  29th,  while  our  men  were 
resting  behind  the  Oise,  the  main 
body  of  the  pursuit  was  still  en- 
gaged in  crossing  the  Somme. 

It  was  amazing  to  see  how 
quickly  the  Army  recovered  during 
these  days  from  the  first  strain 
of  the  Retreat.  Even  on  the  28th 
the  improvement  was  notable. 
A  general  cheerfulness  pervaded 
the  ranks,  whence  derived  no  one 
seemed  to  care,  but  splendid  and 
infectious.  Men  toughened  and 
hardened;  the  limpers  grew  fewer, 
and  already  battalions  were  to  be 
met  marching  with  the  old  swing  to 
the  old  song.  By  the  29th  —  for 
always  we  come  back  to  this  cru- 
cial date  —  the  first  hard  appren- 
ticeship was  over;  and  when  the 
Army  rose  from  its  sleep  to  take 


86    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

the  road  once  more,  it  looked  and 
felt  an  army  of  veterans.  Officers 
smiled  as  they  watched  their  men, 
and  speculated  happily  on  the  day 
to  come. 

The  chief  difficulty  now  was  to 
replace  wastage  in  equipment,  etc., 
which  had  been  enormous.  For  in 
the  strain  and  confusion  of  the  Re- 
treat everything  detachable  had 
been  lost  or  thrown  away,  and 
whole  companies  were  found,  per- 
fectly fitted  out  eight  days  before, 
which  had  now  scarcely  a  single 
greatcoat,  waterproof  sheet,  or 
change  of  clothing  left.  The  de- 
ficiency of  entrenching  tools  —  to 
take  only  one  article  of  equipment, 
though  that,  perhaps,  the  most 
easily  lost  —  amounted,  in  the 
troops  which  had  fought  at  Le  Ca- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     87 

teau,  to  over  eighty  per  cent.  It 
was  much  easier,  unfortunately,  to 
tabulate  these  deficiencies  than  to 
supply  them.  The  stores  existed,  in- 
deed, but  they  were  not  to  be  had. 
They  were  lying  for  the  fetching 
on  the  quays  and  in  the  depots 
of  Havre  and  Rouen  and  Boulogne, 
but  every  day's  march  took  us 
farther  away  from  them  and  in- 
creased their  exposure  to  the  Ger- 
man advance.  With  Amiens  al- 
ready in  the  enemy's  hands,  and 
the  Channel  ports  uncovered,  we 
were,  for  a  moment,  that  portent 
of  the  textbooks,  an  army  without 
a  base.  It  was  a  case  for  prompt 
measures,  and  prompt  measures 
were  taken.  On  August  29,  while 
the  Army  was  recounting  deficien- 
cies on   the   Oise,   the   Inspector 


88    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

General  of  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion, by  order  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  was  arranging  a  grand  re- 
moval to  the  mouth  of  the  Loire, 
and  on  August  30,  the  new  British 
base  was  temporarily  established 
at  St.  Nazaire  and  Nantes,  with 
Le  Mans  as  advanced  base  in 
place  of  Amiens.  It  was  a  great 
achievement,  but  an  unwelcome 
change,  for  both  by  sea  and  by 
land  the  distances  were  greater, 
and  it  had  the  inevitable  conse- 
quence of  delaying  the  arrival  of 
everything  on  which  the  Army  de- 
pended for  replenishment.  The  in- 
fantry went  without  their  great- 
coats and  entrenching  tools;  and 
though  reinforcements  of  men  con- 
tinued to  arrive  at  stated  intervals, 
—  the  first  reinforcement  on  Sep- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     89 

tember  5,  and  the  second  on  Sep- 
tember 7  and  8,  —  the  guns  which 
should  have  come  on  August  29 
were  not  actually  received  till 
September  19.  It  was  not  until 
October  11,  when  the  British  Army 
was  setting  out  for  Flanders,  that 
St.  Nazaire  was  at  last  definitely 
closed  down,  and  Havre  and  Bou- 
logne reopened  in  its  place.  It  was 
a  difiicult  period  for  the  adminis- 
trative departments  of  the  Army, 
and  had  its  own  triumphs. 

The  lull  in  operations  on  the 
British  front  during  the  29th,  and 
the  restoration  of  contact  with  the 
French,  were  turned  to  good  ac- 
count by  the  Allied  leaders,  whose 
opportunities  for  meeting  and  ex- 
changing views  had  hitherto  been 
rare.    A   conference   was  held   in 


90    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

the  early  afternoon  at  British 
Headquarters  in  Compiegne,  which 
was  attended  not  only  by  General 
Joffre  and  Sir  John  French,  but 
by  the  three  British  corps  com- 
manders and  General  Allenby.  The 
conference  was  presided  over  by 
the  French  Commander-in-Chief, 
who  showed  himself,  then  as  al- 
ways, where  the  British  were  con- 
cerned, "most  kind,  cordial,  and 
sympathetic."  "He  told  me,"  says 
Sir  John  French,  "that  he  had  di- 
rected the  Fifth  French  Army  on 
the  Oise  to  move  forward  and  at- 
tack the  Germans  on  the  Somme, 
with  a  view  to  checking  pursuit. 
He  also  told  me  of  the  formation 
of  the  Sixth  French  Army  on  my 
left  flank,  composed  of  the  Seventh 
Army  Corps,  four  reserve  divisions. 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     91 

and  Sordet's  corps  of  cavalry."  In 
conclusion,  having  dealt  with  the 
immediate  necessities  of  the  British, 
he  outlined  once  more  his  strategic 
conception,  to  draw  on  the  enemy 
at  all  points  until  a  favourable  situ- 
ation should  be  created  for  the  de- 
sired offensive,  and  in  conformity 
with  that  conception  directed  the 
Retreat  to  proceed.  The  bridges 
over  the  Oise  were  promptly  de- 
stroyed, and  at  various  hours  be- 
tween mid-afternoon  of  the  29th 
and  early  morning  of  the  30th  the 
British  forces  set  out  on  a  twenty- 
mile  march  to  the  Aisne,  through 
beautiful  country  which  they  were 
no  longer  too  tired  to  enjoy.  By 
the  afternoon  of  August  30,  the 
whole  Army  was  in  position  a  few 
miles  north  of  the  line  Compiegne- 


92    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

Soissons,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
Germans  occupied  La  Fere.  On 
the  morning  of  August  31  the  Re- 
treat was  resumed,  and  from  this 
date  until  September  4  continued 
practically  from  day  to  day  in  con- 
formity with  the  movements  of 
the  French,  our  men  becoming 
daily  fitter  and  more  war-hardened. 
Rumours,  however,  of  successful 
French  actions  on  our  flanks,  and, 
amidst  much  that  was  vague  and 
wearisome,  a  growing  sense  of  com- 
bination and  ulterior  purpose  in 
their  movements,  encouraged  all 
ranks. 

The  country  now  was  much 
more  difficult,  for  after  the  Forest 
of  Compiegne  is  passed  the  land 
plunges  into  deep  wooded  ravines 
and  break-neck  roads,  very  trying 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     93 

for  guns  and  transport,  and  for  all 
manner  of  manoeuvres.  The  heat 
was  intense,  and,  to  make  matters 
worse,  the  enemy  pursuit,  which 
had  unaccountably  languished,  was 
becoming  closer  and  more  insist- 
ent. The  British,  bivouacked  that 
night  between  Crepy-en-Valois  and 
Villers-Cotteret,  found  themselves 
committed,  on  the  morning  of  Sep- 
tember 1,  to  two  of  the  hottest 
skirmishes  of  the  Retreat;  one  at 
Villers-Cotteret,  where  the  Fourth 
(Guards')  Brigade  was  covering 
the  retirement  of  the  Second  Divi- 
sion, the  other  on  the  left  at  Nery, 
in  the  area  of  the  Third  Corps. 

The  action  at  Villers-Cotteret 
began  about  nine  o'clock,  in  very 
difficult  forest  country,  and  con- 
tinued   until    after    midday,   the 


94    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

Guards'  Brigade  maintaining  its 
ground,  despite  heavy  losses,  with 
a  steadiness  and  determination 
worthy  of  the  heroes  of  Landre- 
cies.  It  was  an  action  easily  de- 
scribed. The  attack  had  been  ex- 
pected, and  was  repulsed.  In  this 
action  the  Irish  Guards,  who  had 
only  been  under  distant  shell  fire 
at  Mons  and  had  had  little  to  do 
at  Landrecies,  received  their  full 
baptism  of  fire.  It  was  their  first 
real  fight,  and  their  commanding 
officer  headed  the  casualty  list. 
The  action  at  Nery  was  quite  un- 
like the  action  at  Villers-Cotteret, 
for  it  came  as  a  surprise,  and  at  one 
time  looked  like  becoming  a  trag- 
edy. The  first  indication  of  danger 
had  reached  the  Headquarters  of 
the  Second  Corps  at  three  o'clock 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     95 

in  the  morning,  when  a  Frenchman 
reported  having  seen  "forty  Ger- 
man guns  and  a  large  force  of 
Uhlans"  moving  in  the  direction 
of  the  Third  Corps,  and  more  par- 
ticularly in  the  direction  of  Nery, 
where  the  First  Cavalry  Brigade 
with  L  Battery,  R.H.A.,  was  bil- 
leted, on  the  left  front  of  the  Brit- 
ish line.  Except  as  regards  the 
number  of  the  guns  the  report 
proved  to  be  true.  The  Germans, 
concealed  from  the  British  by  a 
thick  mist,  —  six  regiments  of  cav- 
alry with  two  batteries  of  six  guns 
each,  —  were  in  position  by  day- 
break on  the  steep  ridge  which 
overlooks  the  village,  when  an 
officer's  patrol  of  the  Eleventh 
Hussars  bumped  suddenly  into 
them  out  of  the  mist.   It  is  possi- 


96    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

ble  that  they  were  as  much  sur- 
prised as  the  British,  for  a  mist 
works  both  ways;  but  they  had 
the  advantage  in  numbers,  arma- 
ment, and  position.  The  alarm 
was  scarcely  given  when  their  guns 
opened  on  the  village,  and  by  five 
o'clock,  when  the  sun  rose,  the 
fight  was  in  full  swing. 

It  was  a  singular  action,  for 
though  our  cavalry,  dismounted 
and  hastily  disposed,  soon  recov- 
ered from  their  surprise,  nothing 
could  alter  the  situation  of  L  Bat- 
tery. Thanks  to  the  mist,  it  had 
been  caught  in  a  position  as  un- 
suitable for  action  as  could  well  be 
conceived.  Unlimbered  in  an  or- 
chard only  four  hundred  yards  off, 
and  perfectly  commanded  by  the 
German  guns,  it  was  throughout 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     97 

the  fight  a  mere  target  for  the 
enemy.  A  tornado  of  shell,  ma- 
chine-gun, and  rifle  fire  was  di- 
rected upon  it,  the  battery  mean- 
while boldly  replying,  though  its 
case  was  hopeless,  and  known  to  be 
hopeless,  from  the  first.  Soon  only 
one  of  its  guns  was  left  in  action, 
and  on  the  serving  of  this  one  gun 
the  attention  of  every  surviving 
officer  and  man  was  concentrated, 
one  after  another  falling  killed  or 
wounded  under  the  fire  of  the  now 
exasperated  enemy.  Captain  Brad- 
bury, loading,  lost  a  leg;  continued 
to  direct,  and  lost  the  other,  and 
was  carried  away  to  die  so  that,  as 
he  said,  his  men  should  not  see  his 
agony  and  be  discouraged.  When 
all  the  officers  had  fallen,  Sergeant- 
Major  Dorrell  took  command,  and 


98    OPEKATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

aided  by  the  machine-guns  of  the 
Eleventh  Hussars,  was  still  main- 
taining the  hopeless  duel  when 
about  eight  o'clock  the  Fourth 
Cavalry  Brigade  arrived,  and  not 
long  after  the  First  Middlesex 
leading  the  Nineteenth  Infantry 
Brigade.  The  balance  was  reversed, 
and  the  enemy,  with,  it  is  said,  the 
one  gun  of  L  Battery  still  firing  at 
them,  retired  in  disorder  towards 
Verrines,  leaving  eight  of  their 
twelve  guns  on  the  field.  Whatever 
their  mission,  it  remained  unful- 
filled. In  this  action,  in  which  a 
serious  disaster  was  so  successfully 
averted,  the  heroic  performance  of 
L  Battery  will  always  be  memor- 
able. It  had  lost,  during  the  en- 
gagement, all  its  officers  and  eighty 
per  cent  of  its  gun  detachments 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS     99 

killed  or  wounded,  without  betray- 
ing by  so  much  as  a  sign  either 
discouragement  or  defeat.  Dis- 
tinctions were  showered  upon  it, 
and  Captain  Bradbury,  Sergeant- 
Major  Dorrell,  and  Sergeant  Nel- 
son were  awarded  the  Victoria 
Cross. 

There  is  a  sequel  to  this  fight  too 
exhilarating  to  be  omitted.  As  the 
First  and  Fourth  Cavalry  Brigades 
were  moving  south  next  morning 
through  the  rides  of  the  Forest  of 
Ermenonville,  they  came  on  the 
tracks  of  horses  and  sent  a  troop  to 
follow  them  up.  "They  found  the 
ride  strewn  with  German  kit  of  all 
kinds,  lame  horses,  etc.,  showing  a 
hurried  retreat.  They  had  gone  by 
five  hours  before,  and  turned  out 
to  be  our  Nery  friends,  the  cavalry 


100    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

division,  who  had  bumped  into  one 
of  our  columns  and  retreated  rap- 
idly, leaving  their  four  remaining 
guns."  It  was  a  very  satisfactory 
finish,  and  had  a  fine  effect  on  the 
whole  Army.  The  story  of  the 
capture  of  the  twelve  guns  ran  like 
wildfire  through  the  ranks,  and 
was  recorded  with  pleasure  by  the 
French  in  their  communique. 

On  September  2,  very  early  in 
the  morning,  the  Army  was  once 
more  on  the  move.  September  1 
had  been  a  hard  day,  and  at  one 
time  something  like  a  general  en- 
gagement was  threatened  on  the 
left  and  left  centre  of  the  British 
line,  the  Fifth  and  Fourth  Divisions 
fighting  model  rear-guard  actions 
which  had  much  to  do  with  the  in- 
activity of  the  enemy  on  the  fol- 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS    101 

lowing  day.  For  on  September  2 
the  pursuit  once  more  relaxed,  and 
by  the  evening  the  British  had 
reached  the  north  bank  of  the 
Marne,  and  were  already  arrang- 
ing for  the  crossing  on  the  follow- 
ing day.  Both  the  march  and  the 
crossing  had  been  contemplated 
with  considerable  misgiving  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  for  on  Sep- 
tember 2  the  Army  was  no  longer 
retiring,  as  it  had  hitherto  retired, 
in  the  direction  of  Paris,  but,  owing 
to  the  position  of  the  bridges,  had 
swung  southeast  and  was  now  ex- 
ecuting what  was  in  effect  almost 
a  flank  march  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy.  The  crossing  of  the  Marne 
was  an  even  more  delicate  opera- 
tion, for  it  involved,  in  circum- 
stances of  comparative  immobility. 


102    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

the  same  dangerous  exposure  to  the 
enemy.  The  enemy,  however,  did 
nothing  to  interrupt  our  opera- 
tions, and  was,  indeed,  reported  by 
our  airmen  to  have  swung  south- 
east also,  and  to  be  moving  in  the 
direction  of  Chateau-Thierry,  to- 
wards the  front  of  the  Fifth  French 
Army.  By  the  night  of  September 
3  the  whole  of  the  British  troops 
were  safely  across  the  river  and  all 
the  bridges  blown  up.  The  left  of 
the  British  Army  was  now  actually 
in  sight  of  the  outlying  forts  of 
Paris,  and  there  was  much  excite- 
ment among  all  ranks  as  to  our 
ultimate  destination.  Should  we, 
after  all,  enter  Paris,  and  sleep  in 
the  beds  of  la  ville  lumiere  ?  It  was 
not  to  be.  A  position  was  occupied 
between  Lagny  and  Signy-Signets, 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS    103 

and  on  the  following  day,  while  the 
enemy  was  bridging  the  Marne,  the 
British  Army  made  the  last  stage 
of  the  Retreat,  finishing  up,  in  the 
cool  of  the  evening,  on  the  line 
Lagny-Courtagon.  This  was  their 
"farthest  south,"  and  on  Septem- 
ber 5,  while  they  rested,  the  great 
news  spread  through  the  Army 
that  the  Retreat  was  over,  and  that 
next  day  the  Advance  would  begin. 
It  would  be  difficult  to  exaggerate 
the  effect  of  the  news.  For  though 
the  Army  had  grown  outwardly 
fitter  and  more  cheerful  during  the 
last  seven  days,  the  profound  dis- 
taste which  was  felt  by  all  ranks 
for  the  perpetual  retirement  poi- 
soned every  activity.  Was  it  never 
to  end,  this  Retreat?  Were  we 
retiring,   then,   to   the   Pyrenees? 


104    OPERATIONS  OF  BRITISH  ARMY 

With  such  bitter  questions  and 
mock-humorous  answers,  they  be- 
guiled the  march.  When  the  news 
came  it  was  as  if  a  great  sickness 
had  been  hfted  from  their  minds, 
and  for  the  first  time,  perhaps, 
they  reahzed  fully,  as  men  do  when 
they  rise  from  sickness,  how  in- 
finitely tired  and  weary  they  had 
been.  They  could  scarcely  believe 
the  news;  but  it  came  from  quar- 
ters not  to  be  denied.  The  "fa- 
vourable situation"  for  which  Gen- 
eral Joffre  had  been  waiting  so 
patiently  had  come  at  last. 


THE  END 


CAMBRIDGE  .  MASSACHUSETTS 
U    .    S    .    A 


THE  LIBRARY 
UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

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